This study analyzes a new set of data on the decisions of conventional arbitrators. The main goal is to draw inferences about the extent to which conventional arbitration decisions are fashioned as mechanical compromises of • the parties' final offers, without reference to the exogenous facts involved, in different disputes. The results of the analysis are remarkably clear: conventional arbitrators tend to split-the-difference between the parties' final offers with virtually no evidence of systematic reference to the facts of the cases. However, since there is a substantial amount of unexplained variance in the arbitration decisions, this evidence of mechanical compromise behavior should be viewed as characterizing the overall operation of conventional arbitration mechanisms and not the behavior of individual arbitrators in any particular case. Indeed, the results are consistent with the view that individual arbitrators pay close attention to the facts of the cases, but that there is considerable variation in the structure of different arbitrators' preference functions. 
Introduction
Arbitration is a rapidly-growing method for resolving disputes. It is used widely in the U.S. and other countries to resolve private disputes arising under commercial contracts and collective bargaining agreements, to resolve civil disputes congesting court systems, and to set wages and other terms of new contracts. Despite the wide range of settings in which it is applied, the central feature of virtually all arbitration mechanisms is that they involve a.
third party, i.e., an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, hearing and deciding how a dispute is to be resolved. Arbitration awards are generally binding, either by law or by ex ante agreement of the disputants.
One of the most important characteristics of arbitration mechanisms is that they may be designed in different ways. For example, under conventional arbitration, an arbitrator is simply asked to render a decision which represents his or her best judgment of a fair settlement. The settlement may, but does not have to be, a compromise between the parties' final offers. In contrast, under final-offer arbitration, each party is required to submit to the arbitrator a single final-offer and the arbitrator is constrained to render a decision which consists of one or the other of those final offers, without compromise.
Clearly, final-offer arbitration is intended to induce concessionary behavior on the part of risk-averse bargainers, each of whom perceives a tradeoff between the probability of "winning" the arbitration and the size of the payoff they Conventional arbitration mechanisms have been objected to on a variety of grounds, the most serious of which is that they "chill" the negotiation process which precedes arbitration. This argument is rooted in the belief that conventional arbitration awards systematically tend to be compromises between the parties' final positions, thereby providing an incentive for the parties to avoid pre-arbitration concessions. This is a difficult assertion to evaluate.
On the one hand, it might be the case that arbitrators often make decisions by reaching a mechanical compromise between the parties' final offers, without paying much attention to the merits of the case. This might be an optimal strategy for arbitrators who want to project an image of fairness so they are hired again by the parties. In addition, since it is easier and less timeconsuming than weighing the facts in a dispute, mechanical compromise is also one way in which arbitrators can engage in shirking. Finally, mechanical compromise might be an optimal decision-making rule for arbitrators if the final offers themselves convey useful information about the nature of efficient settlements. Indeed, if final offers do contain useful information which arbitrators are particularly skilled at extracting, mechanical compromise behavior is not a legitimate complaint against conventional arbitration.
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely in practice that an arbitrator could determine whether a pair of final offers contained useful information without at least some reference to exogenous data on the facts of a case. In this situation, arbitration decisions will not be simple mechanical compromises of the parties' final offers, but rather, they will be functions of both the offers and the facts.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the parties' final bargaining positions are determined by their expectations about an arbitration award. In other words, if bargainers A and B expect an arbitrator to render a settlement that is relatively favorable to bargainer A, their negotiations will almost certainly take place over settlements that tend to be favorable to A, provided that arbitration is compulsory if they fail to resolve their dispute voluntarily. Thus, arbitration decisions may appear to be mechanical compromises of the parties' final positions, but only because the parties aligned themselves around the arbitrator's preferred settlement point.
The purpose of this study is to analyze arbitrator decision-making under conventional arbitration. The main goal is to try to draw inferences about the extent to which conventional arbitration decisions are mechanical compromises of the parties' final offers. This will be done mainly by comparing estimates of alternative models of arbitrator behavior that have proven useful in recent empirical studies. These models will be fit to a new set of data on actual arbitrator's decisions in a series of hypothetical arbitration cases.
The following section will set out, the empirical models of arbitrator behavior that have formed the basis for empirical work in this area. Section III will discuss the conclusions that can be drawn from previous attempts to implement these models. Section IV will describe the experimental design used to generate a new data set on the behavior of conventional arbitrators. Section V will present and discuss the results of fitting alternative empirical models to these new data. Section VI will discuss the main conclusions of the paper.
II. Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior
The purpose of this section is to outline two alternative models of arbitrator behavior in the resolution of wage disputes. The main difference between these models lies in the information that arbitrators use to make their decisions. In the first model the arbitrator's preferred settlement (i.e., the percent wage increase Wa) is determined solely by reference to the facts of the case (X). Empirically, we specify the following:
where is a vector of weights and c is a random error which captures the effect of unobserved variations in economic environments and differences in and one to (ib). They show that these two models are observationally equivalent and that the parameters and a are identified frou data on the parties' final offers and the arbitrators' decisions. Thus, by testing for the commonality of parameters in the behavior of conventional and final offer arbitrators, Ashenfelter and Bloom are able to make inferences as to whether arbitrators give weight to the parties' final offers under conventional arbitration.
The second approach to analyzing the behavior of conventional arbitrators involves an ingenious attempt to overcome the potential simultaneity of arbitration decisions and final offers by exogenously fixing those offers. This approach, due to Bazerman and Farber (1985) and Farber and Bazerman (1986) , was implemented by asking members of the National Academy of Arbitrators to render arbitration decisions in 25 different bargaining scenarios, each with its own set of facts and final offers. By their very construction, data generateçi in this manner do not suffer from the simultaneity or observability problems Overall, the Ashenfelter-Bloom model does not provide a strong test of the -7-mechanical compromise hypothesis. Nor does it provide unambiguous results on this issue. For example, the hypothesis is not rejected in the simple specifications reported, but it is rejected in the richer specifications.
However, the great strength of this model is that it tests the mechanical compromise hypothesis using data derived from an operating arbitration system.
The Bazerman-Farber approach to testing f or mechanical compromise behavior under conventional arbitration also has several problems. First, the hypothetical arbitration scenarios were designed so that the final offers were orthogonal to the "facts" of the cases. This feature of the scenarios has no analog in actual arbitration where final offers are endowed with information content via their link to the facts of a case. This is unfortuhate since it is the information content of the final offers which makes it potentially sensible for the arbitrators to give them weight. The failure to provide arbitrators with -any decision-making criteria is also unfortunate. 
IV. Experimental Design
Although the Bazerman and Farber analysis of mechanical compromise behavior has serious problems, their basic approach is quite clever and fundamentally sound. Thus, -it seems reasonable to repeat the experiment they conducted in a way that overcomes as many of the problems they faced as possible. This task was done in early 1984 by sending a new set of hypothetical arbitration cases to roughly the same population of arbitrators. and (4) statistical exhibits supporting the positions of one or both parties.
Arbitrators were asked to examine the information describing the bargaining dispute, to consider that information in light of New Jersey's Arbitration Law, and to render a conventional arbitration award ordering the implementation of whatever salary (or salary increase) they thought to be most reasonable.
Arbitrators were also provided with a two-page description of the New Jersey Arbitration Law which included a list of the substantive items they were supposed to weigh in their deliberations (e.g., comparability, ability-to-pay, etc.). Data on police officer salaries in 6 New Jersey communities and 4 non-New Jersey communities from 1979 to 1983 were provided as background -information. Finally, arbitrators were provided with a decision form asking them to record and outline the basis for their decision. This form also requested information about the professional background and experience of each arbitrator and asked for an evaluation of the arbitration exercise.
In the process of preparing the four abridged arbitration cases, a curious feature of the link between facts and final offers was discovered. In particular, it was observed in the actual arbitration cases that the arguments used to advance a particular position were never so narrowly specified so as to 
Estimation Results
The purpose of this section is to determine whether the arbitrator responses to the arbitration cases described in the previous section permit us to make inferences about whether equation (la) or equation (ib) is more likely to be the true model generating conventional arbitration decisions. compared to a critical value of 2.41 at the 5 percent level). Since there were literally no differences in the facts presented for individual cities, these dummy variables may be viewed as completely characterizing those facts. Thus, under the maintained hypothesis that conventional arbitrators' render decisions without reference to the parties' final offers, the estimates of equation (1) suggest that arbitrators are able to discern differences between the cases which they reflect in their decisions.
It is, of course, possible that the significance attributed to the facts results from omission of the final offers from the regression. In other words, since the offers are correlated with the underlying facts of the case by design, misspecifying the regression by omitting the offers might result in the coefficients of the city dummies picking up their own effect plus some of the effect of the offers. The first column of estimates of equation (lb), which simply adds in the average of the partiesT final offers. as a regressor, is informative about this possibility. Indeed, there are three noteworthy features of these estimates. First, the city dummies are no longer significant in this equation, either singly or jointly. in addition, the coefficients of the city dummies all become quite small in magnitude when the average final offer enters the equation. Second, the average final offer explains significantly more of the total variation in the arbitration decisions than do the facts of the cases (e.g., the from a regression which just includes the average of the final offers is .447). Third, the coefficient on the mean of the final offers (i.e., .880) is significantly greater than zero, but not significantly different from one. Thus, a clear winner seems to emerge when the facts and the final offers are permitted to "fight it out" in the regression.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there is still a considerable amount of random variation in the decisions of the arbitrators even after the inclusion of both the facts and the final offers (e.g., the standard error of the regression is 1.4 percent).
The first column of structural coefficients reports parameter estimates that are not scaled by y. Note that the point estimates of the structural constant and the city coefficients are reasonably large in magnitude, although none are significantly different from zero. Thus, the data seem to contain little information about the arbitrators' underlying preferences viz-a-viz the facts of the cases.. Alternatively, the data may be indicating that there is considerable variation in the structure of different arbitrators' preference functions. In addition, since the estimate of (1-y) (the weight on the final offers) is not significantly different from one, it appears that the relationship between the arbitration decisions and the average of the final offers is well-described by a 45 degree line that goes through the origin. In other words, it appears that arbitrators tend to engage in mechanical compromise behavior that can literally be described as "splitting-the-difference."
The final column of estimates in Table 2 Unlike previous studies which apply sophisticated econometric techniques to relatively weak data (and report finding little evidence of compromise behavior), this study seeks to generate somewhat richer data and apply a simple econometric technique. Ultimately, it is impossible to determine the extent to which conclusions drawn from these data generalize to behavior in an actual arbitration system. Nonetheless, the fact is that all of the arbitrators who provided decisions for this study are members of the National Academy of Arbitrators, an organization of the most experienced arbitrators in North
America. In addition, over 75 percent of the participating arbitrators indicated that the arbitration exercises captured the main features of interest arbitration "reasonably well" or better. Finally, since all of the arbitration awards analyzed were accompanied by a one paragraph arbitration decision in which arbitrators almost always justified their decision in terms of the facts of the case, it is hard to argue that arbitrators decided these cases in a substantially different manner than they would decide an actual case.
Taken at face value, the results of this study are remarkably clear:
conventional arbitrators tend to split-the-difference between the parties' final offers with little systematic reference to the facts of the cases. However, because of the substantial amount of unexplained variance in arbitration awards, this characterization of arbitrator behavior should not be regarded as applying to any particular case. Rather, it reflects a systematic tendency of arbitrators across some population of cases. Indeed, of the 55 decisions analyzed in this study, only 8 were exactly equal to the average of the parties'
final offers.
The results of. this study do not necessarily imply that arbitrators ignore the facts in the cases they hear. Indeed, the nature of the written arbitration decisions analyzed in this study support the view that arbitrators do pay attention to the facts. Thus, the statistical results seem to be indicating that arbitrators do not share a common preference function. In other words, arbitrators do give weight to the facts, but different arbitrators do -it so differently that the weight tends to show up as random noise. This conclusion is supported by estimates of significant inter-arbitrator differences in behavior presented in Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) and Bazerman (1985) , and in research on Iowa's system of tn-offer arbitration discussed in Ashenfelter (1985) .
The estimates presented in this study suggest that the standard deviation of the underlying distribution of arbitral preferences, controlling for the facts of a case, is 11.75 percent. Put another way, if arbitrators were asked to decide the cases in this study without having any knowledge of the parties' final offers, roughly two-thirds of the awards would be in the range -8.5
percent to 15.0 percent, and one-third of the awards would lie outside that range. Perhaps arbitration systems provide arbitrators with knowledge of the parties' final positions to lower this grossly high variance. Alternatively, it might be that arbitrators would be able to lower the variance themselves by studying the facts of the cases more closely in situations in which final offers were not available. One might even conjecture that final-offer arbitration is just the type of mechanism which can induce arbitrators to extract relatively more information from the exogenous facts of a case.
The results of this study are consistent with the view that conventional arbitrators use the parties' final offers to provide information on the range of settlements that bargainers are likely to view as acceptable. Since this task could probably be accomplished more inexpensively by averaging the parties final offers and adding on some noise using a computer's random number generator, the findings of this study raise an important question about arbitration's raison d'etre. Undoubtedly, the answer to this question has something to do with the superior ability of a human arbitrator to fine tune arbitration decisions, to endow them with legitimacy in the eyes of disputants, and to induce bargainers to reveal true reflections of their underlying preferences. But this is surely an incomplete answer to a question which seems most worthy of deeper consideration. *Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. The standard errors of the structural estimates of the constant and the coefficients of the city dummies in equations (lb) were computed from the asymptotic distribution of the ratio of two coefficients (e.g., the regression constant ') and the estimate of y implied by the regression coefficient on (We+Wu)/2) -**North Bergen is the reference category for the city dummies.
